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STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Is a retailer of allegedly defective goods entitled to b^ indemnified for its attorney's
fees from a co-defendant

manufacturer

where the purported indemnitee's

attorney's

fees were expended to defend itself and not the manufacturer, where the retailer has
paid nothing to the plaintiff and where the goods in question were never shown to be
defective?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties to this appeal are co-defendants in a products liability action brought
by the purchasers of a single-engine aircraft manufactured by respondent The Cessna
Aircraft Company (CESSNA), and sold to plaintiffs by appellant Trans-West Aircraft
Sales, Inc. (TRANS-WEST). TRANS-WEST cross-claimed against CESSNA for contribution.
Prior to trial, the principal action was settled and plaintiffs gave a complete release.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court rendered summary judgment
in favor of CESSNA and TRANS-WEST appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Before setting forth the facts which CESSNA believes support the judgment of
the trial court, CESSNA feels constrained to point out that a party cannot cite references
to its own pleadings or the testimony of its own witnesses as support for the proposition
that a certain fact is uncontroverted. TRANS-WESTTs statement of facts is repleat with
such citations.
This action began as a products liability suit by the plaintiff-purchasers of a small
aircraft against CESSNA, the manufacturer; Cessna Finance Corporation, the lienholder;
Teledyne Industries, Inc., the engine manufacturer; AAR Northwest, Inc. (AAR), a regional
distributor of CESSNA; and TRANS-WEST, the retail seller of the aircraft.
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Plaintiffs'

claims were settled against all defendants under a usual release stipulating that such
settlement constituted no admission of liability on the part of the settling defendants.
TRANS-WEST made no contribution to the settlement and now seeks to recover its costs
and attorney's fees from CESSNA.
On April 18, 1979, TRANS-WEST sold the subject aircraft to plaintiffs. (R.4).
TRANS-WEST purchased the aircraft from defendant AAR, its regional distributor, (Id.).
In addition to providing plaintiffs with CESSNA sales literature, TRANS-WEST made
oral representations regarding the economics of owning the subject aircraft and how
fast the aircraft would depreciate, which representations were not contained in the
CESSNA sales literature. (Grant Depo. at 86-7, attached to appellant's brief as pp. 45-47).
Plaintiff Grant testified that the economics of owning it was one of the factors which
motivated the purchase of the aircraft. (Id.)
On January 29, 1982, plaintiffs purported to revoke their acceptance of the aircraft
and tendered it to Cessna Finance Company through whom they had purchased it. (R.10).
On June 10, 1982, plaintiffs commenced the instant action for damages against all defendants. (R.2-16).
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged deceit (R.5-10), negligent misrepresentation (R.ll),
breach of express and implied warranty (R.ll-12), and negligence (R.13) against all defendants, including TRANS-WEST, both as an agent of CESSNA and specifically on TRANSWEST's own behalf. (R.4, If 18). In April, 1983, TRANS-WEST cross-claimed against all
its co-defendants, including AAR, the distributor from which it had purchased the airplane,
seeking indemnity for the amount of any judgment plaintiffs recovered against TRANSWEST, plus interest, costs and attorney's fees. (R.1205-1209).
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In February, 1985, a compromise settlement was reached between plaintiffs and
all defendants, including TRANS-WEST. (R.1246-49). TRANS-WEST paid nothing to plaintiffs in settlement of the principal action. (R.1257). An order dismissing the entire action,
except for TRANS-WESTTs cross-claims for indemnity, was entered by the district court.
(R.1251-1252). It is admitted that there is no written or oral agreement by which CESSNA
was obligated to accept TRANS-WESTTs alleged tender of defense (R.1386), and TRANSWESTTs cross-claim is predicated solely upon the doctrine of implied indemnity.
On January 6, 1986, the district court denied TRANS-WESTTs motion for summary
judgment and granted CESSNAS parallel motion, dismissing TRANS-WESTTs cross-claim
for indemnity. (R.1401-03).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. Since TRANS-WEST was defending itself against allegations of its own intentional torts, breach of warranty and other wrongful conduct, its costs and attorneys
fees were not expended for CESSNAS benefit, and TRANS-WEST is not entitled to indemnification from CESSNA.
2. Since there was no showing of TRANS-WESTrs or CESSNAS liability before
the principal action was settled, TRANS-WEST is not entitled to indemnification.
POINT I.
TRANS-WEST CANNOT RECOVER COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES EXPENDED IN ITS OWN DEFENSE OF PLAINTIFFS1
CLAIMS.
In Utah, the rule is long-established that attorney's fees are not "damages" and
that they will be awarded only when provided for by contract or statute. Devore v.
Bostrum, 632 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1981). TRANS-WEST urges this Court to adopt an exception to this general rule, which is that an indemnitee may recover from his indemnitor
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not only the amount the plaintiff recovered against the indemnitee, but also the indemnitee's costs and attorney's fees.
The specific question of whether a retailer of goods may recover its attorney's
fees from the manufacturer under an implied indemnity theory is one of first impression
in Utah. Among other jurisdictions, there is a split of authority. TRANS-WEST relies
on the decisions of a minority of jurisdictions which allow the retail seller to recover
his attorney's fees from the manufacturer where the retailer has not changed or modified
the goods prior to selling them to the plaintiff. However, the majority and better-reasoned
rule is that where the retailer defends allegations directed at him and not the manufacturer, he cannot recover his attorney's fees.
A.

Where A Retailer Defends Against Allegations Made Against It, The Manufacturer
Has No Duty To Indemnify The Retailer For Its Costs And Attorney's Fees.
The most oft-cited majority rule case is Davis v. Air Tech Industries, Inc., 582

P.2d 1010 (Cal. 1978). There, the California Supreme Court considered indemnity claims
by a seller against a manufacturer, where both were co-defendants in a products liability
case. At trial, both the manufacturer and the seller were found liable to the injured
plaintiff. The trial court awarded the seller indemnification for all the damages it was
obliged to pay the plaintiff and for the seller's attorney's fees in defending the action.
The manufacturer, noting the general rule in California (as in Utah) that attorney's fees
will be awarded only where a statute or an agreement so provides, appealed the award
of attorney's fees.

The California Supreme Court, Chief Justice Bird writing for the

Court, reversed, stating:
Davis urges this court to adopt a broad new exception authorizing attorney's fees for defendants who prevail on claims
for implied indemnity.
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Even if this court were to carve out such an exception
for indemnified tort defendants, a review of the purpose
behind this exception reveals that it would not apply in cases
where the indemnitee incurred attorney's fees solely in defense
of his own alleged wrongdoing.
*

*

*

The better reasoned, modern decisions . . . have refused to
compel manufacturers to pay attorney's fees to indemnify
its suppliers and distributors who have defended against allegations that they were independently liable for negligence or
breach of warranty, [citations omitted] To shift attorney's
fees in such cases would be inconsistent with the general
rule that tort defendants, even if vindicated, must pay for
their own defense, [citation omitted].
Id. at 1012-13. See also, Harbor City Discount Auto Center, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 157 Cal.Rptr. 438 (1979).
The relative merits of CESSNA and TRANS-WEST's respective positions were
recently discussed in detail by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
construing Idaho law. As in Utah, the Idaho courts have not spoken directly to this issue.
In Weston v. Globe Slicing Machine Co., 621 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1980), the plaintiff filed
a lawsuit against the manufacturer, the distributor and the retailer of a meat chopping
machine which injured him, alleging theories of strict liability, negligence and breach
of warranty.
Subsequently, and exactly as TRANS-WEST did here, the retail seller filed a crossclaim against the manufacturer for indemnification for fees and costs incurred in its
defense against plaintiff's complaint. The retailer contended that it sold the meat chopping
machine to plaintiff without any change in its condition and that any defect in the machine
which might have caused plaintiff injury was therefore the manufacturer's responsibility.
The jury found for plaintiff against the manufacturer, but found in favor of the retailer.
However, the trial court dismissed the cross-claim with prejudice and the retailer appealed,
contending its entitlement to recover the attorney's fees expended in its own, successful,
defense.
-5-

The Ninth Circuit affirmed and expressly rejected the minority rule cases relied
upon by the retailer: Pender v. Skillcraft Industries, Inc., 358 So.2d 45 (Fla. App. 1978),
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Crosetti Bros., Inc., 475 P.2d 69 (Ore. 1970), and Addy
v. Bolton, 183 S.E.2d 708 (S.C. 1971). Interestingly, these are the same cases upon which
TRANS-WEST relies. The Court noted:
Although we have distinguished the facts in the Pender
case from those in our case, in any event, we respectfully
decline to follow the decision in that case, and, instead approve
the reasoning in the opinions of the California and North
Dakota courts in Davis and Conrad as expressing sounder
and more logical principles and results in cases involving
facts and issues much like those in the case before us.
We hold that Moore cannot recover indemnification for
its attorney fees and costs from Globe since MooreTs defense
expenses were incurred for Moorefs benefit in defending itself
against allegations of its own wrong-doing. This is especially
true in view of the Idaho general rule that a party must pay
its own attorney fees in the absence of a statute or a contract
providing otherwise, [citation omitted].
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court denying
Moore indemnification for attorney fees and costs from Globe
and dismissing MooreTs cross-claim against Globe with prejudice
is affirmed.
621 F.2d at 349-50. TRANS-WEST admits at page 2 of appellant's brief that the attorney's
fees for which it seeks indemnification were incurred by TRANS-WEST ". . . in defending
itself in the product liability action brought by the plaintiffs . . ." Thus, under the rule
in Weston, even if CESSNA had been found liable to plaintiffs, TRANS-WEST, in defending
against allegations of its own wrongdoing, would have no recourse against CESSNA for
costs and attorneys fees.
TRANS-WEST asserts that it made no express warranties other than those contained
in CESSNA sales literature. Although this assertion is disputed by the testimony of plaintiff Grant, even if it were true it ignores the implied warranties arising by operation
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of law. TRANS-WEST sold the airplane to plaintiffs, and therefore under Section 2-314
of the Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. Section 78A-2-314 (1965), impliedly
warranted to plaintiffs that the goods were merchantable. Further, plaintiffs alleged
that TRANS-WEST breached the implied warranty of "fitness for particular purposes."
(R.12, 1f 1f 50 & 51). Only TRANS-WEST knew of the specific purpose for which plaintiffs
desired to purchase and use this aircraft.

Plaintiffs sued TRANS-WEST specifically on

these warranties. Paragraph 18 of plaintiffs1 complaint state^:
TRANS WEST, on its own behalf and as an agent of CESSNA
. . . did advertise, describe and represent the'subject aircraft
(Emphasis supplied).
In addition to the implied warranties, plaintiffs al$o sued TRANS-WEST on the
express warranties and representations that TRANS-WE$T alone made to plaintiffs.
Contrary to TRANS-WESTTs representations to the Court, plaintiff Brooke Grant testified
that a representative of TRANS-WEST made representations regarding the economics
of owning the subject aircraft which were not included pn CESSNATs sales literature,
i

and that he relied on them. (Grant Depo. at 86-7, attached to appellants brief as pp.
45-46). Plaintiff Grant further testified that the economics of owning the aircraft was
one of the factors that motivated the purchase. (Grant Depb. at 20, attached as Appendix
A).
That TRANS-WEST was defending its own interests rather than CESSNAS is further
demonstrated by reference to the first count of plaintiffs^ complaint, labelled "Deceit."
The count, pleading the intentional tort of fraud, is directed against all defendants, including TRANS-WEST. (R.5). Further, the prayer of the complaint seeks punitive damages
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from defendants, again including TRANS-WEST (R.16). These allegations of intentionally
tortious conduct relate as much to TRANS-WEST as they do CESSNA or any of the other
defendants.
In addition, the principal remedy of recision sought by the plaintiffs was applicable
only as against TRANS-WEST, plaintiffs' immediate seller.

Prior to filing its action,

plaintiffs tendered the airplane to defendant Cessna Finance Company, the secured creditor through whom plaintiffs had financed the purchase. Plaintiffs' complaint seeks recission of the sale and specifically alleges that plaintiffs, by tendering the aircraft to the
secured lender, have revoked their acceptance by purchase under Utah Code Ann. Section
70A-2-608. There is no evidence that TRANS-WEST was acting as an agent of CESSNA
when it sold the aircraft it had purchased from AAR to the plaintiffs, and the law is
clear that a buyer of goods may revoke his acceptance or "rescind" only as to his immediate
seller, and not as to the manufacturer (CESSNA) or intermediate supplier (AAR) of the
goods. See, Clark v. Ford Motor Co., 612 P.2d 316, 318-19 (Ore. App. 1980); Reece v. Yeager
Ford Sales, Inc., 184 S.E.2d 727, 10 U.C.C.R.S. 82 (W.Va. 1971).
Also, contrary to the allegations of implied contract contained in Point Three
of Appellant's Brief, there was no contact between TRANS-WEST and CESSNA regarding
TRANS-WEST's purchase of the aircraft.

All of TRANS-WEST's contacts regarding its

purchase of the aircraft were directly with the defendant AAR (Appellant's Brief, p.
7, para. 17).
B. The Court Must Look To The Allegations Of The Complaint In Determining Whether
TRANS-WEST Was Defending Itself Or CESSNA.
On page 27 of appellant's brief, TRANS-WEST quotes the case of Herman v. General
Irrigation Co., 247 N.W.2d 472 (N.D. 1976) for the proposition that it is entitled to indemnification for its attorney's fees. However, as pointed out by the North Dakota Supreme

-8-

Court in its subsequent decision in Conrad v. Suhr, 274 N.lfV.2d 572 (N.D. 1979), Herman
did not address the question of attorney's fees as part 0f any indemnity award to a
retailer-indemnitee. In Conrad, the Court adopted the majority rule on first impression
and held that a dealer in farm equipment could not recover his costs and attorney's fees
from the equipment's manufacturer, even though the retailer was exonerated at trial
and the manufacturer was found liable to the plaintiff, t h e Court, relying on Farr v.
Armstrong Rubber Co., infra, and Davis v. Air Tech Industries, Inc., supra, noted that
the retailer had defended on allegations of his own negligence, breach of implied warranty
and strict liability and, therefore, he could not recover attorney's fees not expended
for the manufacturer's benefit.
In deciding the question of whether a retailer claiming indemnity for his attorney's
fees was defending against allegations of his own wrongful conduct (and thus would not
be entitled to attorney's fees as a part of his indemnification), the Court in Conrad ruled
that the pleadings and the allegations made by plaintiff shoul<3 be determinative.
. . . [W]e express the view that the pleadings are an integral
part of litigation and that in determining whether or not
a party may be indemnified for his attorneys! fees and costs,
the court may examine the pleadings to determine whether
or not the party seeking indemnification from another was
exclusively or partially defending itself against allegations
of his own negligence, his own warranty, or of strict liability.
Ld. at 578. The rule of the North Dakota Supreme Court in [Conrad was expressly adopted
by the Court in Weston v. Globe Slicing Machine Co., 621 F^2d 344 (9th Cir. 1980) in construing Idaho law. See p.p. 7-8, supra.
Here, as the pleadings attest on their face, plaintiffs $ued TRANS-WEST not simply
as an agent of CESSNA but in its own right, and for fraud, Negligence and breach of warranties and representations for which TRANS-WEST was Responsible, and for a remedy
(recision) which could be applicable only against its direct seller, TRANS-WEST.
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C.

The Question Of Whether TRANS-WEST Changed Or Inspected The Aircraft Before
Sale To Plaintiffs Is Irrelevant To Whether TRANS-WEST Was Defending Allegations
Made Against It.
TRANS-WEST asserts that it was a "mere conduit" for the goods in question and

that since it simply passed the goods along to plaintiffs without changing them, that
it should be indemnified by the manufacturer.

The majority of courts considering this

argument have rejected it. For example, in Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 179 N.W.2d
64 (Minn. 1970), the plaintiff was injured when his camper truck veered off the highway
following a blow-out of one of its rear tires. Plaintiff sued both the manufacturer and
the retailer of the allegedly defective tire, under theories of strict product liability and
breach of implied warranties. The plaintiff prevailed against both defendants at trial.
The trial court granted indemnity in favor of the retail seller against the manufacturer
for the amount of the judgment, but denied the retailer's claim for attorneys' fees.
In Farr, as here, the retailer argued that it was completely passive and had made
no additional warranties of its own, save what were supplied by the tire's manufacturer.
The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that the retailer had made no warranty
of its own except for the implied warranty of merchantability and had not, in any event,
perpetrated any active wrong on the plaintiff.
. . . [A]s was correctly pointed out in the trial court's memorandum, Olson's liability stems solely from its passive role
as the retailer of a defective product furnished to it by the
manufacturer, and it therefore is entitled to indemnity.
W!. at 72.
Nonetheless, the Court sustained the trial court's refusal to award attorneys' fees
noting that the retailer had been sued by plaintiff in its own right.
In cases where a party seeking indemnity has been required
to defend claims arising out of another's wrongful conduct
and also to defend accusations which encompasses [sic] separate
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wrongful acts, the court may properly disallow attorney's
fees in indemnity actions. Since Olson was required to defend
against the breach of warranty claims, it wa$ in the position
of defending its own wrongful conduct and therefore reasonable
attorneys' fees must be denied. (Emphasis supplied).
Id. at 72-3. Thus, even though the retailer was defending himself only on the allegation
of breaching the implied warranty of merchantability, his | entitlement to indemnity did
not include attorneys' fees, for precisely that reason. See ^lso, Sorenson v. Safety Flate,
Inc., 235 N.W.2d 848, 852 (Minn. 1975); Shaffer v. Honeyw|ell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251, 260
(S.D. 1976).
Likewise, in Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2|d 143, 156-57 (Mo. 1967), the
court ruled that where the retail seller was defending itself against plaintiff's allegations
of the retailer's own negligence, the retailer was not entitled to a judgment against the
manufacturer for his defense costs, even where retailer had obtained a directed verdict
against plaintiff at trial.
It is important to bear in mind that the issue in this dase is not whether the retailer
of defective goods has a claim for indemnification against the manufacturer of those
goods for damages resulting from such defects. The question here is simply whether
a retailer can recover its costs and attorney's fees from a manufacturer where the retailer
was defending against allegations made against it. This is a distinction which TRANSWEST fails to make when it states on pages 20-21 of appellant's brief that Champion
Mobile Homes v. Rasmussen, 553 S.W.2d 237 (Tex.Civ. A|pp. 1977) is ". . . on all fours
factually with the instant case . . . ." That statement is not Correct.
Champion involved cross-claims for contribution and! indemnity between a retailer
and a manufacturer of goods. However, unlike the case at bar, a jury trial determined
that the goods in question were defective when they left the manufacturer's control
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and both the retailer and the manufacturer were found to be liable to the plaintiff. This
critical distinction aside, however, the holding in Champion is of no assistance to TRANSWEST, since although indemnity was granted, no attorney's fees or costs were awarded.
TRANS-WEST also relies on the Florida District Court of Appeal's decision in
the leading minority rule case, Pender v. Skillcraft Industries, Inc., 358 So.2d 45 (1978).
That case, too, is distinguishable on its facts from the case at bar. There, the manufacturer was found at trial to be liable to the plaintiff, and the retailer-indemnitee was
completely exonerated.

Although the court permitted the indemnitee to recover his

attorney's fees even though he paid no judgment, the Pender decision cautions against
the broad-brush approach to indemnification urged by TRANS-WEST in this appeal:
Our holding should not be construed to open a floodgate for
cross-claims seeking indemnification when there is no connection between the cross-claimants and the party from whom
indemnification is sought.
Id. at 46.
Here, although there is a dealer agreement between TRANS-WEST and CESSNA,
TRANS-WEST did not acquire the plane from CESSNA, but purchased it from AAR.
(R.1158). Since there is no privity between CESSNA and TRANS-WEST, TRANS-WEST
would not be entitled to its attorney's fees from CESSNA, but rather would have to look
to its seller, AAR. Although TRANS-WEST cross-claimed against AAR for indemnity,
it elected not to pursue the matter against AAR.
Further, in a decision of the Florida District Court of Appeals since Pender, it
was held in Maple Chair Co. v. W. S. Babcock Corp., 385 So.2d 1036 (Fla. App. 1980) that
the trial court's award of indemnity on the retailer's motion for summary judgment was
improper since there had been no finding of any liability of the manufacturer to the plaintiff. In the instant case, CESSNA was never found liable to the plaintiffs, the action
having been settled without any finding or admission of liability.
-12-

D.

CESSNA Had No Obligation To Accept TRANS-WEST's "Tender."
TRANS-WEST makes much ado about its "tender1' of the defense of plaintiffs1

claims against TRANS-WEST at the inception of the litigation. CESSNA submits that
the issue of the propriety of TRANS-WESTTs "tender" is immaterial since, even if a proper
tender was made, CESSNA had no duty to defend TRANS-WEST given the substance
of plaintiffs' allegations.
The record reflects that upon receiving the summons and complaint, TRANS-WEST'S
manager telephoned the AAR zone manager and informed him of the suit, and demanded
that CESSNA accept the defense of TRANS-WEST. (Battachio Depo. at 13, R.1417 jet
seq.) Unsurprisingly, since he was unaware of any of the allegations of the complaint,
TRANS-WEST's demand was refused. (Id. at 14, 20, R.1417 et se£.) Nothing in the record
indicates that TRANS-WEST's "tender" was ever reiterated or even put in writing.
As has been demonstrated at length above, the complaint alleges fraud, breach
of express and implied warranties and negligence on the part of TRANS-WEST, not only
as an agent of CESSNA, but in its own right. It prays for a revocation of its acceptance
of the aircraft from TRANS-WEST and asks for punitive damages against all defendants,
including TRANS-WEST.
The very purpose behind the doctrine of indemnity is
. . . to authorize the reimbursement of the defense costs
of a party held constructively liable "because of the actual
default of another for whose benefit the defense [was] really
conducted . . ."
Davis v. Air Technical Industries, Inc., supra, at 1012 (Emphasis in original) quoting C.
& Q. C. Co. v. County Comm'rs., 57 Md. 201, 226 (1881). It is apparent that TRANS-WEST
was "tendering" the defense of causes of action alleged against itself. Under such circumstances, the majority of jurisdictions considering the matter have concluded that any
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award of indemnity does not include the costs of defense. TRANS-WEST had many months
before the case was settled in which it could have a t t e m p t e d to eliminate plaintiffs T
allegations against it which it now so vociferously denies, but TRANS-WEST did nothing.
If, as TRANS-WEST claims, this was CESSNAS fight alone, why were such allegedly
spurious claims not eliminated by pretrial procedures and the case then tendered to
CESSNA?

There was never a proper tender because the claims being made individually

against TRANS-WEST were never eliminated and any vicarious claims made "tenderable."
POINT II.
A RETAILER CANNOT CLAIM INDEMNITY WHERE NEITHER
THE MANUFACTURER NOR THE RETAILER HAVE BEEN
FOUND LIABLE AND THERE HAS BEEN NO FINDING THAT
THE PRODUCT WAS DEFECTIVE.
Finally, even applying the minority rule advanced by TRANS-WEST, it has not
shown a substantive entitlement to indemnification from CESSNA.

A retailer such as

TRANS-WEST has the burden of proof to show it is entitled to indemnification.

As the

Idaho Supreme Court held in Williams v. Johnston, 442 P.2d 178, 184 (Idaho 1968),
It is the conclusion of the court that unless liability of the
claimed indemnitee [retail seller] to the third party [injured
plaintiff] is established, the right to indemnification does
not arise.
Here, nothing in the proceedings before the district court demonstrated that CESSNA
was liable to plaintiffs or that the subject aircraft was defective, nor that any defect
resulted in injury to plaintiffs.

The admitted language of the settlement release signed

by plaintiffs specifically s t a t e s :
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that this
settlement is a compromise of a contingent and unliquidated
claim and that payment hereunder is not to be construed
as an admission of liability on the part of those released,
by whom liability is expressly denied.
(R.1386).
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Even under the authorities accepting the minority view advanced by TRANS-WEST,
a retailer must still show that the manufacturer supplied a defective product which caused
injury to the plaintiff, before the issue of the retailer's ri^ht to indemnification can be
addressed. In D.G. Shelter Products Co. v. Moduline Industries, Inc., 684 P.2d 839 (Alaska
1984), the purchaser of a new mobile home sued the manufacturer, MODULINE, and the
retail seller, Pioneer Brokerage and Sales (PIONEER) for physical injuries allegedly caused
by formaldehyde fumes emanating from the mobile home. Shortly before trial, MODULINE
filed a third-party action against SHELTER and other component suppliers. The trial
court severed the third-party action for trial.
After a jury trial, judgment was rendered in favor of MODULINE and PIONEER.
The judgment was appealed and the case remanded for retHal. Before the second trial,
PIONEER, MODULINE, SHELTER and the other third-party defendants jointly settled
the owner's claim. After the settlement, MODULINE sought an award of attorneys fees
from SHELTER on the theory of common law indemnity and breach of warranty. The
trial court granted summary judgment and awarded attorneys fees to MODULINE.
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the aw^rd of attorney's fees holding:
We hold that summary judgment was improper. The settlement agreement between Moduline and Shelter did not have
the effect the trial court thought it did. Shelter did not admit
to having produced a defective product. It Explicitly stated
that the settlement agreement:
is in no way to be construed as a judicial admission
of defect or as an opinion that it would have been
possible for William and Arline Heritage to establish
the existence of the defect if there had been a full
and complete trial on the merits . . . .
Whether Shelter supplied a defective product must be resolved
before liability for attorneys fees can be determined.
Id. at 541.
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In the instant case, the principal action was settled before trial and neither
TRANS-WEST nor CESSNA were found liable to plaintiffs, nor was the subject aircraft
ever found to be defective. TRANS-WEST has cited no case where indemnity of attorneys
fees was awarded in circumstances where the retailer was never found liable to the plaintiff and no determination was ever made that the goods were defective or non-conforming.
TRANS-WEST misconstrues the pleading rules and the two cases it cites in Point
Six of its brief. They merely hold that indemnity claims may be filed in the principal
action so that all claims may be decided in one action. They do not suggest that the
indemnitee need not prove the liability of the indemnitor at some point in the litigation
in order to hold the indemnitor liable. Since TRANS-WEST had the burden of proving
such a defect by a preponderance of evidence and failed to do so, the trial court properly
entered judgment in favor of CESSNA.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING CESSNAS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
TRANS-WEST asserts in Point Nine of its brief that the trial court erred in "not
allowing" a trial on the issue of whether the aircraft in question was defective. This
is indeed an interesting argument considering the fact that TRANS-WEST, as well as
CESSNA, made a motion for summary judgment, thereby representing to the trial court
that it had placed in evidence all the facts which it wanted the court to consider in ruling
upon its claim. The court below did not refuse to allow a trial as TRANS-WEST contends,
but simply granted one partyTs motion for summary judgment on cross-motions of both
parties, which asserted that no material issues remained in controversy and that each
was willing to have its case determined on the record then existing as a matter of law.
TRANS-WEST now takes the position of demanding a trial on the question of
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whether the aircraft was defective.

Putting aside the point that under the majority

rule such an inquiry would be irrelevant since TRANS-WEST was defending only itself
in the action, TRANS-WEST is not now entitled to a trial on the issue since it not only
failed to request it in the court below, but affirmatively asserted that such a trial was
unnecessary due to the absence of any material questions of fact necessary to decide
the issues raised by its motion for summary judgment. It is fundamental that a party
may not claim as error a position raised for the first time on appeal. See Utah County
v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983); Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development
Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983).
CONCLUSION
The majority and better-reasoned cases throughout the nation "have refused to
compel manufacturers to pay attorneys fees to indemnify suppliers and distributors who
have defended against allegations that they were independently liable for negligence
or breach of warranty." Davis v. Air Technical Industries, Inc., 582 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Cal.
1978). Although the retailer may be indemnified for any judgment he must pay to the
injured plaintiff, where he defends on his own behalf his right to indemnity does not include
costs and attorneys fees, since these were not expended for the manufacturer's benefit.
CESSNA submits that attorney's fees cannot be awarded since TRANS-WEST was
clearly defending its own interests and not those of CESSNA. This is particularly true
considering the long-established rule in Utah that except where provided for by statute
or contract, a tort defendant must bear his own attorney's fees. To hold that TRANS-WEST
may recover its attorney's fees under the circumstances of this case would be to cut
a gaping hole into an otherwise seamless cloth.
In addition, even if a rule awarding a retailer indemnification for his attorney's
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fees were adopted, TRANS-WEST has shown no substantive entitlement to any such indemnification, since there has been no finding that the product was defective or that TRANSWEST or CESSNA was liable to the plaintiffs. No trial on these issues is required since
TRANS-WEST made no request for trial to the district court, but rather, moved for summary judgment. In any event, the issue of whether the goods in question were defective
or not is irrelevant, since TRANS-WESTTs attorney's fees were clearly incurred to defend
against allegations directed towards it, including recision.
CESSNA respectfully prays that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed and
that it be awarded its costs on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of July, 1986.

H. WAYNE WADSWORTH

R. L. KNUTH
of and for
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent The Cessna Aircraft
Company.
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APPENDIX A

Q

When you say this P-210, you mean the subject plane we're

all talking about?
A

Yes.

It generally had —

they were generally very heavy

in avionics and that was necessary to obtain what Cessna was
telling me that they could obtain, the efficiency, the
effectiveness, to be as good as a twin would be.
Q

Can you think of any other features that you —

that

motivated your purchase?
A

Let me think for a minute.

I think one critical one was

the economics of operating the P-210, and it's what Cessna
pushed was the fact that you could operate one and obtain the
same results as with a twin at a lower cost.

It was

supposedly the lowest cost pressurized airplane, and the
single engine, of course, burned half or less the fuel than a
twin engine would, so the economics were a very major reason
and as you know, by 1979, gas prices were starting to increase
substantially.
Q

Have we exhausted those features that attracted you to

the P-210?
A

No, there's some other ones.

It was gorgeous looking,

sexy, exciting and, you know, the ultimate.

It was the

neatest airplane to have come along.
Q

I wonder if you could tell me who financed the sale of

the aircraft?
A

Cessna did.
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